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EU Fiscal Governance and the 
Eff ectiveness of its Reform
ALEXANDRE DE STREEL*
A COMMON CURRENCY area leads to multiple externalities, or spill-over eff ects, among its participating countries. One of these externalities relates to national fi scal policy. Th is is especially the case when fi nan-
cial markets are, on the one hand, imperfect and do not charge diff erent risk 
premiums between countries according to their risk profi les, and, on the other 
hand, are integrated and fi nancial institutions hold signifi cant debts of foreign 
countries. In such circumstances, there is a risk that a country runs a large fi scal 
defi cit by free-riding on the credit rating of the others.1 To deal with this exter-
nality risk, the architects of EMU decided to constrain national fi scal policies 
with rules backed by sanctions.2 Th us the TFEU imposed numerical limits on 
government defi cit and debt (Protocol No 12 on the excessive defi cit proce-
dure), established an annual surveillance of national fi scal policies (Article 121 
TFEU) and a sanction procedure when the fi scal limits were breached (Article 
126 TFEU). Moreover, the TFEU also provided that a national defi cit could 
not be monetized (Articles 123–24 TFEU) and that the EU or the Member 
States could not be liable for or assume the commitments of another Member 
* Th e author wishes to thank Pierre Larouche and Federico Fabbrini for their very useful 
comments as well as the participants of the Conference on the Constitutionalization of European 
Budgetary Constraints, Tilburg, May 2013 for helpful discussions.
1 For a discussion of this externality, P de Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, 9th edn (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2012) 218–26. He shows that, empirically, it is not clear whether fi scal 
discipline is lower in monetary unions.
2 Th e Maastricht negotiations were based on the Report on Economic and Monetary Union in 
the European Community, prepared by the Committee chaired by J Delors and presented in April 
1989. On the background to the negotiations, see K Dyson and K Featherstone, Th e Road to Maas-
tricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). On the 
model of governance decided, see J Pipkörn, ‘Legal Arrangements in the Treaty of Maastricht for 
the Eff ectiveness of the Economic and Monetary Union’ (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review 263; 
MJ Herdegen, ‘Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic and Monetary Union: Th e 
Law as Guardian of Economic Wisdom’ (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 9–32; JV Louis, ‘A 
Legal and Institutional Approach for Building a Monetary Union’ (1998) 35 Common Market Law 
Review 33–76; HJ Hahn, ‘Th e Stability Pact for European Monetary Union: Compliance with Defi cit 
Limit as a Constant Legal Duty’ (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 77–100.
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State (no-bailout clause: Article 125 TFEU). Th us the governance model chosen 
was based on the maintenance of fi scal decentralization constrained by fi nancial 
markets and rules and without fi nancial solidarity. Other models were possible, 
such as more centralized fi scal policy, but they were not politically feasible at 
the time.
Th e past decade has showed that the model chosen did not work well. Th ere 
are several reasons for this, including fi scal rules that were poorly designed and 
not well implemented. When added to the other banking and macroeconomic 
diffi  culties created by the 2008 global fi nancial crisis, this led to some Member 
States experiencing high levels of fi nancial instability since 2010. In turn, this led 
to more fi nancial solidarity than envisaged by the architects of EMU3 and cast 
doubt on the credibility of the no-bailout clause.4 To remedy such weaknesses, 
EU fi scal governance has been substantially reformed in three main waves. Th e 
fi rst wave was the adoption in November 2011 of the ‘six-pack’, a set of fi ve 
regulations and one directive. Th ese make the fi scal rules stricter and improve 
the sanction procedure, notably by increasing their automaticity.5 Th e second 
wave was the adoption in March 2012 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG, the ‘Fiscal 
Compact’), an international treaty concluded by 25 EU Member States outside 
the EU legal framework but relying very much on EU institutions.6 Th is Treaty 
provides for the constitutionalization of the EU fi scal rules and the creation of 
3 In 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) with a lending capacity of €440 billion 
and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) with a lending capacity of €60 billion 
were established. Th ey were replaced in 2012 by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with a 
lending capacity of €500 billion. On those instruments, see A de Gregorio Merino, ‘Legal Develop-
ments in the Economic and Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: Th e Mechanism of Finan-
cial assistance’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1613–46; JV Louis, ‘Guest Editorial: Th e 
No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Package’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 971–86.
4 Note that the CJEU validated the ESM Treaty with regard to the non-bailout clause by adopting 
a teleological interpretation of the clause: ‘Given the objective pursued by Article 125 TFEU, it 
must be held that that provision prohibits the Union and the Member States from granting fi nan-
cial assistance as a result of which the incentive of the recipient Member State to conduct a sound 
budgetary policy is diminished.  … However, Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting of 
fi nancial assistance by one or more Member States to a Member State which remains responsible for 
its commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such 
as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy’: Case C-370/12 Pringle v 
Ireland [2012], judgment of 27 November 2012, nyr, [136]–[137].
5 Th e six-pack was published in [2011] OJ L306. Most of its provisions entered into force on 13 
December 2011. Th e six-pack was negotiated on the basis on the Final Report of 21 October 2010 
by the Task Force on Economic Governance which was endorsed by the European Council of 28–29 
October 2010. Note that the Stability and Growth Pact regulations had already been amended in 
2005 to make the fi scal rules smarter: see F Amtenbrink and J de Haan, ‘Economic Governance in 
the European Union: Fiscal Discipline Versus Flexibility’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 
1075–106; JV Louis, ‘Th e Review of the Stability and Growth Pact’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law 
Review 85–106.
6 P Craig, ‘Th e Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism’ 
(2012) 37 European Law Review 231; S Peers, ‘Th e Stability Treaty: Permanent Austerity or Gesture 
Politics’ (2012) European Constitutional Law Review 404.
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a national correction mechanism next to the EU sanction procedure.7 Th e third 
wave was the adoption in May 2013 of the ‘two-pack’, a set of two EU regulations 
that apply only to Member States whose currency is the euro. Th ese regulations 
improve the national institutional framework and reinforce the Commission and 
Council oversight over national fi scal policies. 8
Th is paper analyses these three waves of reform. Th e fi rst section is descrip-
tive and gives a brief overview of the new fi scal governance as modifi ed by the 
six-pack, the TSCG and the two-pack. Th e second section is critical and analyses 
the weaknesses of the original fi scal governance and the eff ectiveness of the 
recent reforms. Th e third section briefl y concludes.
I. OVERVIEW OF EU FISCAL GOVERNANCE
EU fi scal governance is based on several legal instruments which are closely 
related: (i) a number of primary EU law provisions; (ii) two EU regulations 
composing the Stability and Growth Pact9 and two EU regulations reinforcing 
and complementing the Stability and Growth Pact for the Member States whose 
currency is the euro;10 (iii) one EU directive and one EU regulation requiring 
minimal quality for the national institutional framework;11 and (iv) the TSCG. 
Th is section analyses the three main components of EU fi scal governance: fi rst, 
the rules constraining national fi scal policies; second, the institutions at the EU 
and national levels in charge of the implementation of the rules; and third, the 
enforcement mechanisms at the EU and national levels.
7 Th e TSCG entered into force on 1 January 2012. It was negotiated on the basis of the Statement 
by the eurozone heads of state or government of 9 December 2011.
8 Th e two-pack was published in [2013] OJ L140. Most of its provisions entered into force on 
30 May 2013.
9 Regulation 1466/97 of the Council of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [1997] OJ L209/1 
as amended by Regulation 1055/2005 and Regulation 1175/2011; Regulation 1467/97 of the Council 
of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive defi cit procedure 
[1997] OJ L209/6, amended by Regulation 1056/2005 and Regulation 1177/2011. For an overview 
of the revised Stability and Growth Pact, see European Commission, ‘Building a Strengthened Fiscal 
Framework in the European Union: A Guide to the Stability and Growth Pact’ (2013) European 
Economy: Occasional Paper 150; European Commission, ‘Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth 
Pact’ (2013) European Economy: Occasional Paper 151.
10 Regulation 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on 
the eff ective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area [2011] OJ L306/1; Regulation 
473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions 
for monitoring and assessing draft  budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive defi cit 
of the Member States in the euro area [2013] OJ L140/11.
11 Directive 2011/85 of the Council of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frame-
works of the Member States [2011] OJ L306/41; Regulation 479/2009 of the Council of 25 May 2009 
on the application of the Protocol on the excessive defi cit procedure annexed to the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community [2009] OJ L145/1, amended by Regulation 679/2010.
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A. Fiscal Rules
EU law and the TSCG provide limiting rules related to actual and structural 
government defi cit and to government debt as well as to the correction path 
when those limits are violated.
(i) Actual and Structural Government Defi cit Rules
Each Member State must maintain its actual government defi cit below 3 per cent 
of GDP, unless either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and 
reached a level that comes close to 3  per  cent, or, alternatively, the excess over 
3  per  cent is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to 
3 per cent.12 Moreover, each Member State must comply with a country-specifi c 
Medium Term Objective (MTO). Th is is a target for the structural defi cit (ie 
the actual defi cit corrected for the eff ects of the economic cycle as well as the 
one-off  and temporary fi scal measures) in the medium term (ie three years). Th e 
target is determined for each Member State according to its government debt. 
Th e Stability and Growth Pact requires that the MTO must be above a fl oor of 
–1  per  cent of GDP13 and the TSCG goes further by requiring that the MTO 
is above –0.5  per  cent of GDP (unless the ratio of government debt is below 
60 per cent of GDP and the risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public 
fi nances are low).14 Th is MTO rule ensures the sustainability of public fi nance 
while allowing room for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular for automatic stabi-
lizers or public investment.
Until a Member State reaches its MTO, it must follow an adjustment path 
towards the MTO by reducing its structural defi cit by at least 0.5  per  cent 
of the GDP per year (or more if the Member State has a government debt 
above 60  per  cent of the GDP or presents pronounced risks of overall debt 
sustainability).15 Th ere is an escape clause in the case of an unusual event outside 
the control of the Member State which has a major impact on the fi nancial 
position of the general government or in periods of severe economic downturn 
for the eurozone or the EU as a whole. In such exceptional circumstances, the 
Member State may be allowed temporarily to depart from the adjustment path, 
provided that this does not endanger fi scal sustainability in the medium term.16
12 Art 126(2) TFEU and Art 1 Protocol no 12 on the excessive defi cit procedure.
13 Art 2(a)(2) Regulation 1466/97 amended. Th e methodology to calculate the MTO is explained 
in the Specifi cations of the Council of 3 September 2012 on the implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact and Guidelines on the format and content of Stability and Convergence Programmes. 
See also European Commission (n 10).
14 Art 3(1b) and (1d) TSCG.
15 Art 5(1) Regulation 1466/97 amended.
16 Art 5(1) in fi ne Regulation 1467/97 amended and Art 3(1c) and (3b) TSCG.
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(ii) Government Debt Rule
Each Member State must maintain its government debt below 60  per  cent of 
GDP, unless the ratio is suffi  ciently diminishing and approaching 60 per cent at 
a satisfactory pace.17 If a Member State has a government debt above 60 per cent 
of GDP, it must reduce it at a satisfactory pace, which implies a reduction of 
the diff erential between the actual debt level and the 60  per  cent of the GDP 
threshold at an average rate of 1/20th per year.18 Finally, the Member States of 
the Eurozone must report to the Commission and the Eurogroup, ex ante and 
in a timely manner, on their national debt issuance plans in order to better 
co-ordinate the planning of such issuance.19
(iii) Transposition of EU Fiscal Rules into National Law
EU law provides that each Member State must enshrine in national law numerical 
fi scal rules which eff ectively promote compliance with EU government defi cit 
and debt rules and their annual budget legislation must refl ect such rules.20 Th e 
TSCG goes further and requires that Contracting Parties transpose into national 
law the MTO rule and its adjustment path through provisions of binding force 
and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to 
be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes.21
B. Institutional Framework
Th e second component of the fi scal governance relates to the institutional frame-
work. EU law and the TSCG provides for minimal quality characteristics of the 
national institutions and for effi  cient EU co-ordination and oversight.
(i) National Institutional Framework
To facilitate the control of the fi scal rules by national and EU institutions, EU 
law provides for minimal quality rules for the budgetary framework defi ned as 
‘the set of arrangements, procedures, rules and institutions that underlie the 
conduct of budgetary policies of general government’.22
17 Art 126(2) TFEU and Art 1 Protocol no 12 on the excessive defi cit procedure.
18 Art 2(1a) Regulation 1467/97 amended and Art 4 TSCG.
19 Art 8 Regulation 473/2013 and Art 6 TSCG; Section III of the Specifi cations of the Council 
of 9 July 2013 on the implementation of the two-pack and Guidelines on the format and content of 
draft  budgetary plans, economic partnership programmes and debt issuance reports.
20 Arts 5–7 Directive 2011/85. Such provisions do not apply to the UK.
21 Art 3(2) TSCG.
22 Art 2 Directive 2011/85.
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Minimal Institutional Requirements Applicable to All Member States
All Member States must have in place public accounting systems comprehensively 
and consistently covering all subsectors of general government, based on the 
European System of Accounts (ESA) 95 standard and subject to internal control 
and independent audits.23 Eurostat, the statistics department of the Commission, 
controls the quality of the national data by running dialogue and methodological 
visits in the Member States.24 Member States must also adopt realistic macro-
economic and budgetary forecasts with sensitivity analysis, and must explain 
any signifi cant divergences from Commission forecasts.25 In addition, Member 
States must establish a credible, eff ective medium-term budgetary framework 
providing for the adoption of a fi scal planning horizon of at least three years.26 
Finally, Member States must establish appropriate mechanisms of co-ordination 
across subsectors of general government and promote fi scal accountability of 
those subsectors.27
Additional Institutional Requirements for Member States whose Currency is 
the Euro
Each Member State of the eurozone must apply a Common Budgetary Timeline 
with three main deadlines: (i) preferably by 15 April but no later than 30 April, 
adoption of a national medium-term fi scal plan; (ii) no later than 15 October, 
adoption of a draft  budget for the forthcoming year; (iii) not later than 31 
December, adoption of the budget.28 Each Member State of the eurozone must 
also establish a national independent fi scal council (IFC) with three main tasks: 
producing or endorsing macroeconomic forecasts and possibly budgetary fore-
casts; monitoring compliance with national numerical fi scal rules; and moni-
toring the implementation of the national automatic correction mechanism in 
the case of violation of the fi scal rules.29 Th ese national fi scal councils must be 
structurally independent or endowed with a high degree of functional autonomy 
vis-à-vis the national budgetary authorities. Th at requires: a statutory regime 
grounded in national law; nomination procedures based on experience and 
competence; adequacy of resources; and appropriate access to information and 
freedom to communicate this publicly in a timely manner.30 In other contexts, 
23 Art 3 Directive 2011/85.
24 Arts 11–11b Regulation 479/2009 amended.
25 Art 4 Directive 2011/85.
26 Art 9 Directive 2011/85.
27 Article 13 Directive 2011/85.
28 Art 4 Regulation 473/2013.
29 Art 5 Regulation 473/2013
30 Art 2(1a) Regulation 473/2013. Some argue that IFCs should be independent from the govern-
ment, but not necessarily from the parliaments: C Fasone and E Griglio, ‘Can Fiscal Councils 
Enhance the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union? A Comparative analysis’ in B 
de Witte, A Héritier and A Trechsel (eds), Th e Euro Crisis and the State of the European Democracy 
(Florence, European University Institute, 2013) 264.
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the CJEU has shown strong support for independence by interpreting strictly 
this requirement and considering it not to be contrary to democratic legitimacy.31
(ii) EU Institutional Framework
EU institutional bodies, in particular those active in the eurozone, have been 
substantially reinforced by the reform of fi scal governance leading to an increased 
institutional diff erentiation between the EU and EMU.32 Regarding bodies 
composed of national executives, the diff erent levels of Member State represen-
tation has been improved. At the top, a Euro Summit, composed of the heads 
of state or government of those Member States whose currency is the euro and 
chaired by an elected president, has been created by the TSCG.33 At the minis-
terial level, the Eurogroup had already been reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty34 
and it is now envisaged that it will be chaired by a full-time president.35 At the 
preparatory level, the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG), which is composed 
of the representatives of the eurozone countries at the Economic and Financial 
Committee, is now chaired by a full-time Brussels-based president.36
Regarding parliamentary bodies, the six-pack and the two-pack establish an 
economic dialogue between, on the one hand, the relevant committees in the 
European Parliament and, on the other hand, representatives of the EU institu-
tions involved in fi scal governance (Commission, Ecofi n Council, Eurogroup, 
European Council) or representatives of the Member States aff ected by fi scal 
governance measures.37 Moreover, a conference of representatives of the relevant 
committees of the European Parliament and representatives of the relevant 
committees of national parliaments has been set up by the TSCG.38
C. Enforcement Mechanisms
Th e third component of fi scal governance is the enforcement mechanisms at the 
EU and the national levels.
31 See Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-1885, in particular paras 30 and 46 
interpreting the independence requirement for a national data protection authority provided by Art 
28(1) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data [1995] OJ L281/31.
32 For an analysis of the integration and the diff erentiation caused by the EMU, see F Snyder, 
‘EMU—Integration and Diff erentiation: Metaphor for European Union’, in P Craig and G de Búrca 
(eds), Th e Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 687.
33 Art 12 TSCG.
34 See Art 137 TFUE and Protocol no 14 on the Eurogroup.
35 Point 5 of Annex I to the Euro Summit Statement of 26 October 2011: Ten measures to improve 
the governance of the euro area.
36 Ibid, points 7 and 8.
37 Article 2(a), (b) Regulation 1466/97 amended; Art 2a Regulation 1467/97 amended; Art 3 
Regulation 1173/2011; Art 15 Regulation 473/2013.
38 Art 13 TSCG.
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(i) EU Enforcement Tools
Annual Multilateral Surveillance Procedure for Fiscal Imbalances
EU law provides for an annual multilateral surveillance procedure, which is inte-
grated into the European semester.39 Th is is the preventive phase of the Stability 
and Growth Pact foreseen by the amended Regulation 1466/97 and comple-
mented, for the eurozone, by Regulation 473/2013.
In April, each Member State submits to the Commission its stability 
programme (if its currency is the euro) or its convergence programme (if its 
currency is not the euro).40 In May, the Commission analyses these programmes 
and, on that basis, proposes country-specifi c recommendations for each Member 
State. In July, the Council adopts the recommendations (Article 121(2) TFEU) 
by a qualifi ed majority and following the ‘comply or explain’ principle, under 
which the Council is expected to, as a rule, follow the proposals of the Commis-
sion or explain its position publicly.41
If a Member State does not comply with its country-specifi c recommenda-
tions, the Commission may address a warning to this Member State (Article 
121(4) TFEU). Th e Commission may also propose a revision of the country-
specifi c recommendations. Th e Council adopts the revised recommendations 
(Article 121(4) TFEU) by a qualifi ed majority and following the ‘comply or 
explain’ principle. Moreover, if the Member State concerned is part of the 
eurozone, the Commission proposes the imposition of an interest-bearing 
deposit of 0.2  per  cent of GDP. Such sanction is deemed to be adopted by the 
Council unless it decides by a qualifi ed majority to reject it within ten days 
(reverse qualifi ed majority).42 Th us, these recommendations do not have direct 
binding eff ect as their violation cannot lead to an infringement case before the 
CJEU. However, they have indirect binding eff ect as their violation may lead 
to an investigation by the Commission and the imposition of sanctions by the 
Council. As in other EU fi elds (such as electronic communications), the recom-
mendations have important legal eff ect through ad hoc sanction procedures. In 
other words, economic governance recommendations have less binding eff ects 
than those of the hard law but more binding eff ects than those of the (standard) 
soft  law.
In addition, Member States of the eurozone are also subject to obligations 
during the second semester of the year. No later than the 15 October, they must 
submit to the Commission and the Eurogroup a draft  budgetary plan for the 
forthcoming year.43 If the Commission identifi es serious non-compliance with 
39 Th e European semester is foreseen by Art 2(a) Regulation 1466/97 amended.
40 Art 4 Regulation 1466/97 amended and Code of conduct of 3 September 2012 on the Specifi -
cations on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines on the format and 
content of stability and convergence programmes.
41 Arts 2(a), (b)(2) and 6(2) Regulation 1466/97 amended.
42 Art 4 Regulation 1173/2011.
43 Art 6 Regulation 473/2013; Section II of the Specifi cations of the Council of 9 July 2013 on the 
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EU fi scal rules, it requests within two weeks the submission of a revised draft  
budgetary plan.44 Otherwise, the Commission adopts in November an opinion 
on those draft  budgetary plans.
Corrective Procedure: Th e Excessive Defi cit Procedure
If a Member State violates EU fi scal rules, the Council may place this state 
under an excessive defi cit procedure (EDP) which gives the Commission and 
the Council signifi cant powers to force Member States to comply with their 
fi scal obligations.45 Th e EDP follows a specifi c timetable that is not necessarily 
aligned with the EU semester. Th e EDP is described in Article 126 TFEU, clari-
fi ed by the amended regulation 1467/97 (the corrective phase of the Stability 
and Growth Pact) and complemented, for the eurozone, by Regulation 473/2013.
Th e EDP starts with a proposal from the Commission to place the Member 
State under EDP and adopt budgetary recommendations with two main 
elements: a correction date by which the actual government defi cit must be below 
3  per  cent of GDP, and an annual reduction path for the structural defi cit.46 
Th e Council adopts the decision on the existence of an excessive defi cit and 
the budgetary recommendation by qualifi ed majority and under the ‘comply 
or explain’ rule (Article 126(6) and (7) TFEU).47 However, when the EDP is 
opened against a Member State whose currency is the euro and on the basis of 
the defi cit rule, the TSCG requires that Member States support the Commission 
proposal unless a qualifi ed majority of them oppose.48 In practice, that means 
the Council decides by reverse qualifi ed majority.
If the Member State concerned is part of the eurozone, it presents to the 
Commission and to the Council an economic partnership programme describing 
the policy measures and structural reforms that are needed to ensure an eff ec-
tively durable correction of the excessive defi cit.49 It is also subject to far-reaching 
reporting requirements to the Commission.50 Moreover, if the Member State has 
previously been condemned during the preventive phase of the Stability and 
Growth Pact or violates signifi cantly EU fi scal rules, the Commission proposes 
implementation of the Two-pack and Guidelines on the format and content of draft  budgetary plans, 
economic partnership programmes and debt issuance reports; Communication from the Commis-
sion of 27 June 2013, Harmonized framework for draft  budgetary plans and debts issuance reports 
within the euro area COM(2013) 490.
 
44 Art 7 Regulation 473/2013.
45 Also European Commission (2013b) and (2013c).
46 Art 3(2) Regulation 1467/97 amended.
47 Art 2a(1) Regulation 1467/97 amended. When an EDP is proposed against a Member State 
whose currency is the euro, only the other Member States whose currency in the euro can vote: 
Arti 139(4b) TFEU.
48 Art 7 TSCG. 
49 Art 9 Regulation 473/2013 and Art 5 TSCG; Section IV of the Specifi cations of 1 July 2013 on 
the implementation of the Two-pack and Guidelines on the format and content of draft  budgetary 
plans, economic partnership programmes and debt issuance reports.
50 Art 10 Regulation 473/2013.
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the imposition of an non-interest-bearing deposit amounting to 0.2 per cent of 
its GDP. Th is sanction is deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides 
by a qualifi ed majority to reject the Commission’s recommendation within ten 
days.51
If the Member State does not comply with the Council budgetary recommen-
dation to end the excessive defi cit, the Commission needs to establish that no 
eff ective action has been taken. Th e Council decides on the failure to take eff ec-
tive action following the ‘comply or explain’ rule and acting by reverse qualifi ed 
majority if the Member State concerned is part of the eurozone and by quali-
fi ed majority otherwise (Article 126(8) TFEU).52 Moreover, if the failing state 
is part of the Eurozone, the Commission proposes the imposition of a fi ne of 
0.2  per  cent of its GDP, which is deemed to be adopted by the Council unless 
it decides by a qualifi ed majority to reject the Commission’s recommendation 
within 10 days.53 Th e Commission also proposes to give notice to the Member 
State concerned to take, within a specifi ed time limit, necessary measures for 
defi cit reduction in order to remedy the situation. Th e Council decides by reverse 
qualifi ed majority and following the ‘comply or explain’ rule (Article 126(9) 
TFEU).54 If a eurozone Member State persists in failing to apply the budgetary 
recommendations, it may be sanctioned by the Council with a fi ne of up to 
0.5 per cent of its GDP and other sanctions such as a revision of the loan policy 
by the European Investment Bank (Article 126(11) TFEU). Alternatively, if the 
failing state is not part of the eurozone but benefi ts from the cohesion fund, 
the Council may decide to suspend any commitments from the fund until the 
state concerned complies with its fi scal obligations.
(ii) National Enforcement Tools
As a complement to the EPD, EU law also requires the establishment of a 
national correction mechanism to increase the eff ectiveness of the fi scal rules. 
Directive 2011/85 provides that the national fi scal rules adopted by Member 
States must entail eff ective and timely monitoring of compliance with the rules, 
based on reliable and independent analysis carried out by independent bodies 
as well as the consequences of non-compliance.55 However, such obligations 
are vague because the legal basis of the directive on the budgetary framework 
(Article 126(14) TFEU) does not allow the imposition of precise and extensive 
obligations.
51 Art 5 Regulation 1173/2011.
52 Art 126(8) TFEU provides for qualifi ed majority rule, but the application of Art 7 TSCG leads 
to a reverse qualifi ed majority.
53 Art 6 Regulation 1173/2011.
54 Art 126(9) TFEU provides for qualifi ed majority rule, but the application of Art 7 TSCG leads 
to a reverse qualifi ed majority. Th is step of the EDP does not apply to Member States whose currency 
is not the euro: Art 139(2b) TFEU.
55 Art 6 Directive 2011/85.
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Th e TSCG goes further by providing that the Contracting Parties must adopt 
a national correction mechanism which is triggered automatically in case of 
signifi cant deviation from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it.56 Th e 
mechanism must be based on seven common principles adopted by the Commis-
sion.57 Th ose principles provide that the correction mechanism is activated in 
case of signifi cant deviation from the MTO adjustment path58 and can only be 
suspended when the conditions for an escape defi ned in EU law are met,59 and 
that the correction must be proportionate to the deviation and must be moni-
tored by an independent fi scal council. Like the MTO rule, such a correction 
mechanism must be included in provisions of binding force and permanent 
character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected 
and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes.60 To ensure that the 
Contracting Parties transpose the MTO rule and the automatic correction mech-
anism into their national laws, such transposition is monitored by the Commis-
sion and subject to the adjudication of the CJEU.61
II. EFFECTIVENESS OF EU FISCAL GOVERNANCE 
AND ITS RECENT REFORMS
Compliance with the EU fi scal rules has varied over time. During an initial 
period, when the Member States were not yet part of the eurozone, the rules 
were relatively well respected because of the perceived political and economic 
benefi ts of being part of the eurozone. Once Member States had been admitted 
to the eurozone, however, compliance with the rules weakened substantially 
because there was no perceived risk of being excluded from the monetary zone 
and the fi nancial markets no longer discriminated according to the diff ering 
risk profi les of the individual Member States.62 Th is contributed to increasing 
economic divergence within the eurozone.63
56 Art 3(1e) TSCG.
57 Communication from the Commission of 20 June 2012, Common principles on national fi scal 
correction mechanisms COM(2012) 342.
58 Art 6(3) Regulation 1466/97 amended stating that the deviation is signifi cant when it is at least 
0.5% of GDP in a single year or at least 0.25 % of GDP on average per year in two consecutive years.
59 Art 5(1) Regulation 1466/97 amended: an unusual event outside the control of the Member 
State concerned which has a major impact on the fi nancial position of the general government or 
periods of severe economic downturn for the euro area or the Union as a whole.
60 Art 3(2) TSCG.
61 Art 8 TSCG.
62 For an evolution of the spreads of ten-year government bond vis-à-vis Germany between 1991 
and 2011, see de Grauwe (n 1) 219.
63 For an analysis of the divergences in the competitive positions in the Eurozone, see among 
others de Grauwe (n 1) 129.
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A. The Weaknesses of Fiscal Governance and its Reform
Such poor compliance was also due to several weaknesses in the design of the 
EU fi scal governance established by the TSCG and the Stability and Growth Pact 
regulations. Th e following paragraphs review such weaknesses and the improve-
ments made by the recent reforms of economic governance (six-pack, TSCG 
and two-pack).
(i) Economic Relevance of the Fiscal Rules
Th e 3  per  cent actual defi cit limit and the 60  per  cent debt ceiling had no 
strong economic justifi cation, and have even been claimed to be stupid by former 
Commission President Romani Prodi. Indeed what is relevant is the sustain-
ability of the public fi nances as captured by the MTO rule and its adjustment 
path. Th erefore, the shift  of focus from the actual defi cit rule to the MTO rule, 
initiated by the fi rst reform of the Stability and Growth Pact regulations in 
2005 and reinforced by the six-pack and the TSCG, is welcome. However, those 
smarter rules are more diffi  cult to apply because the calculation of the structural 
defi cit is complex and methodologies are subject to debate among economists. 
Moreover, they are less transparent and less easy to explain to the general public, 
hence the case for painful socioeconomic reforms to meet those rules is more 
diffi  cult to make. An additional improvement to the rules would be to diff eren-
tiate between public expenditures for productive investment and expenditures 
which do not generate return in the future.64
(ii) Quality Budgetary Data and Macroeconomic Forecasts
Th e fi scal rules cannot be applied properly, as shown in the case of Greece, if 
the national and EU institutions cannot rely on complete, reliable, timely and 
consistent statistical data as well as on independent macroeconomic forecasts. 
Th e recent reforms improve the quality of the data by conferring additional 
investigative powers on Eurostat65 and providing for sanction if it is found that 
statistics have been manipulated.66 Th ese reforms also improve the quality of 
the forecasts by requiring, for the eurozone Member States, that forecasts are 
produced or endorsed by an independent national fi scal council.67
64 In that regard, see European Commission, ‘Th e Quality of Public Expenditures in the EU’ 
(2012) European Economy: Occasional Paper 125.
65 Arts 11–11b of the Regulation 479/2009 amended.
66 Art 8 Regulation 1173/2011.
67 Arts 2(1)(b) and 4(4) Regulation 473/2013. Th e usefulness of the Independent Fiscal Councils 
has been shown in X Debrun, D Hauner and M Kumar, ‘Independent Fiscal Agencies’ (2009) 23 
Journal of Economic Surveys 44.
EU Fiscal Governance and the Eff ectiveness of its Reform 97
(iii) National Ownership
Initially, the EU fi scal rules were poorly owned by the national institutions. In 
most Member States, they were not transposed into national law, and no national 
institution was specifi cally in charge of their implementation. However, national 
ownership of EU fi scal rules is one of the key requirements for the success of 
EMU because fi scal policies remain decentralized and the Commission alone 
does not have suffi  cient knowledge, expertise, political capital and legitimacy 
to ensure that all Member States comply with EU fi scal rules. Th us, one of the 
main objectives of the recent reforms was to increase the ownership of fi scal 
rules. First, the six-pack (Directive 2011/85) provides minimal requirements for 
the national fi scal framework, in particular by imposing national fi scal rules 
incorporating some of the EU rules. Th en, the TSGC requires the transposition 
of the MTO rule and national correction mechanism into national law pref-
erably at the constitutional level. Finally, the two-pack (Regulation 473/2013) 
requires the establishment of an independent fi scal council with an extensive 
monitoring role. It is now up to the Commission, as the guardian of EU law 
(and of some TSCG provisions), to ensure that Member States implement and 
apply correctly Directive 2011/85, Regulation 473/2013 and the TSCG. If this is 
achieved, the Commission could then partner with independent national insti-
tutions to promote fi scal responsibility.
An additional improvement could be the establishment of an European 
network made of the national fi scal councils and the Commission in order to 
strengthen independent fi scal council, to exchange best practices, and ultimately 
to contribute to the diff usion of fi scal discipline within each Member State. Such a 
network of national authorities has been used successfully in the network indus-
tries such as electronic communications with the Body of the European Regula-
tors for Electronic Communications (BEREC)68 or energy with the Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).69 Th ose networks of authorities 
contributed to the acceptance of a new liberalization policy paradigm promoted 
by the EU institutions, and oft en opposed by the majority of the Member States, 
and led to an appropriate implementation of the paradigm. To be sure, there 
are important diff erences between economic governance and the regulation of 
network industries as the former carries more political importance than the latter 
and the role of the independent fi scal council is merely advisory while the role of 
national regulatory authority is regulatory, but it remains that the usefulness of 
the network of authorities in energy or electronic communications off ers impor-
tant lessons for the role and the organization of the independent fi scal councils.
68 Regulation 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the 
Offi  ce [2009] OJ L337/1.
69 Regulation 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing 
an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators [2009] OJ L211/1.
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(iv) Typology of the Sanctions
Initially, the sanctions foreseen by the Treaty were of three main types:
• Reputational: a sanction of this kind increases transparency which, in turn, 
leads to political as well as fi nancial incentives (through an increase of a 
Member State’s borrowing costs) to comply with the rules. Unfortunately, 
such sanctions do not work very well as fi nancial markets are imperfect and 
tend to underreact (before the euro crisis) or overreact (aft er the euro crisis) 
to fi nancial information.
• Suspending or terminating the allocation of EU funds. In particular, the 
European Investment Bank may reconsider its lending policy,70 and cohesion 
funds may be suspended.71 Such sanction can be eff ective and has been 
applied successfully against Hungary in 2012.72
• Imposition of fi nes. Th e credibility and the eff ectiveness of fi nes is a complex 
matter. If the Member State is able to pay the fi ne without undermining its 
fi nancial stability, the sanction is credible; hence the threat of a fi ne provides 
an incentive to comply with the fi scal rules. Th is has been shown by Belgium 
which improved its fi scal adjustment plan in June 2013 due to the threat of 
being fi ned by the Council.73 Conversely, if the Member State is unable to pay 
the fi ne or if the imposition of the fi ne jeopardizes its fi nancial stability, the 
sanction is not credible. In other words, a fi ne is only eff ective if it is imposed 
or threatened to be imposed early in the surveillance procedure when the 
Member State does not face a liquidity or solvency crisis.
Th e recent reforms improve the design of the sanctions. First, the possibility of 
suspending or terminating transfer of EU funds will be extended to all types 
of structural funds. Second, the fi nancial sanctions are more graduated (going 
from interest-bearing deposit to non-interest-bearing deposit to fi ne) and can be 
imposed earlier in the excessive defi cit procedure and even during the preventive 
phase of the Stability and Growth Pact. Some, notably Germany, have proposed 
another type of sanction, namely the suspension of the voting right in the 
Council. However, this new type of sanction requires a Treaty change.
70 Art 126(11) TFEU.
71 Art 4 Regulation 1084/2006 of the Council of 11 July 2006 establishing a Cohesion Fund [2006] 
OJ L210/79, as amended.
72 Implementing Decision 2012/156 of the Council of 13 March 2012 suspending commitments 
from the Cohesion Fund for Hungary with eff ect from 1 January 2013 [2012] OJ L78/19; and Imple-
menting Decision 2012/323 of the Council of 22 June 2012 lift ing the suspension of commitments 
from the Cohesion Fund for Hungary [2012] OJ L165/46.
73 See Press Speaking Points of 29 May 2013 by Vice-President Rehn, SPEECH/13/481; Decision 
2013/370 of the Council of 21 June 2013 giving notice to Belgium to take measures for the defi cit 
reduction judged necessary in order to remedy the situation of excessive defi cit [2013] OJ L190/87.
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(v) Decision-Making Process for Sanctions
Initially, EU sanctions were proposed by the Commission and decided upon 
by the Council under qualifi ed majority voting. Inevitably, this led to intense 
political bargaining between, on the one hand, the Member State susceptible 
to sanction, and, on the other, the Commission and the other Member States. 
Th is was the case during the Ecofi n meeting of November 2003 when France 
and Germany managed to convince a blocking minority of Member States to 
oppose the Commission proposals for Council decisions to step up the excessive 
defi cit.74 Moreover, the adjudicating power of the CJEU, with its independence 
and objectivity, was very limited by the Treaty.75
Th e recent reforms have improved the decision-making process of the sanc-
tions adopted at EU and national levels. Regarding EU sanctions, a distinction 
should be made between the decision-making process within the Commission 
(to propose the sanction) and that within the Council (to impose the sanction). 
Within the Commission, an extensive habilitation has been granted to the 
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Aff airs and the Euro in order to 
increase the independence of the decision-making process.76 Within the Council, 
most of the sanctions imposed against a Member State whose currency is the 
euro are decided by reverse qualifi ed majority in order to reduce the possibility 
of bargaining between Member States. Based on an empirical analysis of other 
procedures where the reverse qualifi ed majority is applied, Van Aken and Artige 
show that the change in voting rule has increased substantially the probability 
of adoption, hence the automaticity in the sanctions proposed by the Commis-
sion.77 In turn, this reinforces the role of the Commission in proposing the sanc-
tions. Regarding national sanctions, Directive 2011/85, but more importantly the 
TSCG and Regulation 473/2013, provide that they should be automatic78 and 
monitored by the independent fi scal council.79
However, some problems remain. Regarding the decision-making process 
within the Commission, there is a tension between the need to reduce the 
political infl uence of Member States on Commissioners and the requirement to 
ensure collegiality among Commissioners. Th e extensive habilitation of the Euro 
Commissioner may tilt the balance too much in the fi rst direction. Moreover, 
the criteria used by the Commission to assess the overall situation of a Member 
State and decide to propose a sanction are not suffi  ciently transparent and may 
74 Th e meeting is summarized in the press release of the Council meeting of 25 November 2003. 
Th e Commission requested the annulment of such deliberation at the CJEU, but partly lost its case: 
Case C-27/04 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I-6649. Th is case triggered the 2005 reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact regulations.
75 Arti 126(10) TFEU.
76 See Commission press release of 27 October 2011, IP/11/1284.
77 W Van Aken and L Artige, ‘Reverse Majority Voting in Comparative Perspective: Implica-
tions for Fiscal Governance in the EU’ in B de Witte, A Héritier and A Trechsel (eds), Th e Euro 
Crisis and the State of the European Democracy (Florence, European University Institute, 2013) 129.
78 Art 3(2) TSCG.
79 Art 5(2) Regulation 473/2013.
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Table 1. Weaknesses of the original EU fi scal governance and improvements
Weakness Original 
system




of fi scal 
rules
Actual defi cit: 
same limit for 
all Member 
States
Introduction of the Medium 
Term Objective (MTO): 
defi ned in structural terms, 
on a medium-term basis, and 
specifi c to each Member State 
to ensure the sustainability of 








• Additional investigation 
powers for Eurostat
• Establishment of 




• Minimum quality for 
the national budgetary 
framework
• Transposition of the MTO 
rule into national law
• Establishment of an 
automatic correction 
mechanism when fi scal rules 
are violated
• Establishment of IFC
Establishment of a 











Financial sanctions are more 
graduated and imposed earlier
Introduction of an 
additional sanction 
consisting in the 









• Habilitation Commissioner 
for Euro
• Council (RQMV)
• Better guarantee for 
collegiality within the 
Commission
• More transparency for 
the economic criteria 
used by the Commission 
to decide to propose 
sanctions against the 
Member States
• Possible more 











mechanism should be based 
on seven common principles 
proposed by the Commission 
Principles may be 
reinforced
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raise suspicion of discrimination between Member States (eg according to their 
size). Th is is all the more important given the enhanced role of the Commission 
resulting from the reverse qualifi ed majority and the ‘comply or explain’ rules 
applicable in the Council. Regarding the national sanction, it is not clear how 
the automatic requirement will be applied in practice. In particular, it remains 
to be seen how and by which institution the activation or the suspension of 
the correction will be decided and what role will be played by the independent 
fi scal councils.
B. Towards more Radical Reforms
In order to ensure the sustainability of the EMU, additional reforms will probably 
be needed, fi rst to complement to current governance model, and then to change 
the model of governance.80
(i) Improving Legitimacy of the Current Model of Governance
Th e fi rst additional reform is to focus on legitimacy as much as on eff ectiveness. 
Th ere is indeed a risk that the recent reforms will backfi re because of their legiti-
macy gaps,81 leading to a rejection by citizens of the new fi scal governance. Th e 
perception of legitimacy gaps may be exaggerated or even fuelled by national 
politicians willing to shift  the blame of painful structural reforms on EU insti-
tutions, but in politics perception is as important as reality. Th e fi rst legitimacy 
issue is that the fi scal rules are constraining the budgetary power of national 
parliaments. Such constraint exists since the adoption of the Stability and Growth 
Pact has become more important and visible with the recent reforms. Th e second 
legitimacy issue is the increasingly important role of the European Commis-
sion (due to the reversed qualifi ed majority voting and the ‘comply or explain’ 
rules applicable in the Council)82 without a parallel increase in parliamentary 
oversight.
Th e Four Presidents Report adopts a simple guiding principle that democratic 
control and accountability should occur at the level at which the decisions are 
taken.83 However, legitimacy must be addressed more forcefully. First, the justi-
80 See also the Communication from the Commission of 28 November 2012, ‘A Blueprint for a 
Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ COM(2012) 777.
81 For a description of the legitimacy gaps, see among others, R Baratta, ‘Legal Issues for the 
“Fiscal Compact”: Searching for a Mature Democratic Governance of the Euro’ in B de Witte, A 
Héritier and A Trechsel (eds), Th e Euro Crisis and the State of the European Democracy (Florence, 
European University Institute, 2013) 31; and F Scharpf, ‘Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the 
Preemption of Democracy’, Max Planck Institute for Study of Societies Discussion Paper 11/11 
(2011).
82 Th e legitimacy issue resulting for the introduction of the reverse qualifi ed majority is also 
analysed by Van Aken and Artige (n 75).
83 Report of 5 December 2012 by Van Rompuy, Barroso, Draghi and Juncker, ‘Towards a Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union’, 13.
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fi cation of the constitutionalization of fi scal rules and the constraint on parlia-
ments’ fi scal power must be better explained, in particular that EU constraint 
replaces the previous monetary constraint (risk of devaluation) existing before 
the common currency and aims to protect future generations by limiting the 
short-term bias of policymakers.
Second, dialogues between institutions should be enhanced to raise aware-
ness of the eff ects of the budgetary decision between Member States, thereby 
facilitating the internalization of fi scal cross-country externalities. Dialogues may 
take diff erent directions. Th ey may be vertical between EU and national execu-
tives as well as between EU and national parliaments (as provided for in the 
interparliamentary conference set up by the TSCG). Dialogues may be diagonal 
between the European Parliament and national executives (as foreseen in the 
economic dialogue set up by the six-pack and the two-pack) as well as between 
EU executive and national parliaments. Th ey may also be horizontal between 
national parliaments, in parallel with the well-established horizontal dialogue 
between national executives within the Council.
Th ird, the oversight of parliamentary bodies over their executives should 
be strengthened.84 At the EU level, the European Parliament should be able to 
supervise Commission actions in economic governance. At the national level, 
the parliaments may, thanks to the objective analysis of the newly established 
fi scal councils, be able to better exercise their budgetary scrutiny and oversight.85
(ii) Towards a (Not So Radically) New Governance Model
Th e second additional reform is to complement the current governance model 
(decentralization and rules backed by sanctions) with other models. One option 
is to back the rules by a mix of sanctions (sticks) and incentives (carrots). Th is is 
the logic of the Competitiveness and Convergence Instrument mentioned in the 
Four Presidents Report,86 and recently proposed by the Commission.87 Member 
States that undertake structural reforms to improve their public fi nances in the 
long run, while incurring short-term costs, could receive fi nancial incentives 
from the EU or the eurozone.
84 Also in this sense, not surprisingly the European Parliament (Resolution of the European Parlia-
ment 2012/2151 of 20 November 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on the report 
of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank 
and the Eurogroup, ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, point 9); Baratta (n 81).
85 Fasone and Griglio (n 30).
86 Ibid 7. Also Resolution of the European Parliament 2012/2151 of 20 November 2012 with 
recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, 
the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup ‘Towards a Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union’, point 12.
87 Communication from the Commission of 20 March 2013, Th e introduction of a Convergence 
and Competitiveness Instrument COM(2013) 165.
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(iii) Towards a (Radically) New Governance Model
A more radical option would be to centralize some fi scal policies at the EMU (or 
EU) level as is the case in nearly all currency unions. Th ere are diff erent possibili-
ties for centralizing fi scal policies. One of them is to establish a budget at EMU 
(or EU) level with insurance characteristics and stabilization functions in case 
of asymmetric shocks between the Member States.88 Such a budget and insur-
ance scheme may be provided for fi nancial institutions with the establishment 
of a common resolution and deposit guarantee mechanism.89 Another budget 
and insurance scheme may be foreseen for the labour market with the establish-
ment of a common employment benefi t scheme.90 Another possibility would be 
the common issuance of eurobonds, to be guaranteed by all the participating 
Member States. In that regard, several possibilities have been proposed.91 One of 
them is the blue bond:92 Member States can participate in a joint eurobond up 
to 60  per  cent of their GDP (blue bond), while debt above 60  per  cent would 
be issued as a national bond (red bond), with a seniority of the blue bonds over 
the red bonds.
If those more radical proposals can be justifi ed economically provided they 
are designed carefully to alleviate moral hazard between the Member States, they 
can only be acceptable politically with a strong sense of common purpose and 
an intense feeling of belonging to the same Community, what de Grauwe calls 
the ‘deep variable’.93 As observed by Habermas:
If one wants to preserve the Monetary Union, it is no longer enough, given the 
structural imbalances between the national economies, to provide loans to over-
indebted states so that each should improve its competitiveness by its own eff orts. 
What is required is solidarity instead, a cooperative eff ort from a shared political 
perspective to promote growth and competitiveness in the euro zone as a whole. 
Such an eff ort would require Germany and several other countries to accept short 
and medium-term negative redistribution eff ects in its own longer-term self-interest, 
a classic example of solidarity.94
88 Report of 5 December 2012 by Van Rompuy, Barroso, Draghi and Juncker, ‘Towards a Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union’, 7; de Grauwe (n 1) 128; H Enderlein et al, Completing the Euro: A 
Roadmap towards Fiscal Union in Europe (Notre Europe, 2012) 30.
89 See the proposals discussed for the banking union.
90 Th is fund could be fi nanced by the Member States or their national security systems and acti-
vated when one Member State faces an asymmetric macroeconomic shock leading to an increase in 
its short-term unemployment rate: S Dullien and F Fichtner, ‘A Common Unemployment Insurance 
System for the Euro Area’ [2013] DIW Economic Bulletin 9.
91 Green Paper of the Commission of 23 November 2011 on the feasibility of introducing Stability 
Bonds COM(2011) 818.
92 P De Grauwe and W Moesen, ‘Gains for All: A Proposal for a Common Eurobonds’ [2009] 
Intereconomics; J Delpla and J von Weizsäcker, ‘Th e Blue Bond Proposal’, Bruegel Policy Brief(2010).
93 De Grauwe (n 1) 132.
94 J Habermas, ‘Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis’, lecture delivered at the Univer-
sity of Leuven on 26 April 2013.
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III. CONCLUSIONS
In 1992 EU fi scal governance was based on fi scal decentralization constrained 
by rules (limits of 3  per  cent government defi cit and 60  per  cent government 
debt), compliance with which was monitored annually and violations of which 
were sanctioned (via the EDP). Financial solidarity was minimal. Th e euro crisis 
and the high level of fi nancial instability of some Member States have shown 
the severe fl aws of such a governance model: the fi scal rules were sometimes 
inappropriate and oft en poorly implemented. Inevitably, then, the crisis led to 
more fi nancial solidarity than expected.
To remedy those fl aws, EU fi scal governance has been substantially reformed 
by the six-pack in 2011, the TSCG in 2012 and the two-pack in 2013. Such 
reforms, which were probably the only politically feasible options, have improved 
the three components of governance: on rules, they make the fi scal objectives 
and limits smarter; on institutions, they improve the quality of data and fore-
casts needed to apply properly the rules, and ensure a better national owner-
ship; on enforcement, they improve the design and the decision-making process 
of the sanctions at EU level and create an national correction mechanism. All 
of this can still be fi ne-tuned: the fi scal rules could better diff erentiate between 
productive and less productive public investment, a network of the Commis-
sion and the newly established national fi scal councils could be set up, and the 
decision-making process and the criteria used by the Commission in proposing 
the sanctions could be made more transparent.
However, more fundamental reforms are needed to ensure the sustainability 
of EMU. Th e legitimacy of the new EU surveillance and sanctions tools should 
be improved in several ways: explaining better the rationale for the constitu-
tionalization of the fi scal rules, enhancing dialogue between EU and national 
bodies (economic dialogue, etc.) as well as among national institutions (parlia-
ment, independent fi scal councils, etc), increasing the EU parliamentary over-
sight where the Commission power has been enhanced. Other models of govern-
ance may also be developed. Th e sticks of fi scal governance (sanctions) should 
be complemented with carrots (fi nancial incentives). More centralization of fi scal 
policy could be by with the creation of a eurozone budget to absorb asymmetric 
macroeconomic shocks or the issuance of common eurobonds. Th ose reforms 
may be diffi  cult to agree today, but the risk is that the fatigue of the citizens 
towards the European Union, of which the economic governance is one of the 
most visible parts, and the rise of nationalism within the Member States, will 
make any reform even more diffi  cult tomorrow.
